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A Huge Step for Women?  
Dlamini-Zuma and the 
African Union Commission
By Awino Okech1
I have watched and listened with interest at the ululations 
surrounding Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s election as the 
new head of the African Union (AU) commission. The 
ululations have been framed first as a gender victory 
and then more broadly. I would like to urge caution to 
the growing voices hailing the power of women and the 
changes that will follow because we now have the first 
woman at the helm of the African Union commission. 
Let me put the detractors rhetoric to rest; I do not urge 
caution, because women are their own worst enemies. 
From a purely women’s movement perspective, this is a 
victory to be celebrated, primarily because the patriar-
chal nature of our societies makes such an achievement 
a significant milestone. Seventeen years after the United 
Nations Beijing conference on women, the ‘playing field’ 
in terms of equal access whether it is framed through 
education, the economy and most importantly social and 
cultural frameworks that reassert gendered hierarchies 
have not been dismantled. 
However, in terms of advancing the discourse on 
women’s leadership we2 must begin to debunk the natu-
ralised assumptions about how women and men conduct 
service. Universal claims about women are invariably 
false and effectively normalise and privilege specific forms 
of femininity and in turn masculinity. I believe that we 
need to recognise that Dlamini-Zuma represents multiple 
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interests. Her gender is just one of the many identities 
she negotiates alongside being a South African, a Zulu, a 
politician, a veteran of South Africa’s liberation struggle 
and the list goes on. Her gender I dare say will not be 
primary determinant of her leadership scorecard if you 
will at the AU commission.
To give Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership at the commis-
sion a fair chance we must nuance this gender victory and 
engage the context of her candidature in order to make 
it work for ‘us’. Most immediately, we must re-engage 
the AU actively and re-write the silence that character-
ised civil society organizations interaction with the AU 
during the leadership impasse between January and July 
2012. Like the Jean Ping-Libya situation where the AU 
felt that Africa misread its actions because they were not 
publicized, civil society actors interested in the AU can 
argue that behind closed doors, they lobbied African 
state representatives to work towards a resolution on the 
AU commission leadership. 
Nonetheless, in the public theatre, it appears that 
we left the decision on who would run the commission 
and steer the Union to the politicians. We constructed  
it as a space in which we would have no influence even 
within the court of public opinion. We waited for direc-
tion from the political class with whom we have had deep 
concerns about their responses to various crises on the 
continent – both overt and covert – Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Madagascar, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali are a few ex-
amples. To assume now that with a woman at the helm, 
automatic access is guaranteed and a different modus 
operandi will be encouraged is at best presumptuous. 
Our failure to exercise leadership during this period 
must be reclaimed through renewed concerted conversa-
tions with the new leadership of the AU and to reclaim 
in tangible terms that the Union is in service of African 
peoples. That cannot be done on the basis of the gender 
card but must be done in the context of the bureaucratic 
cultures Dlamini-Zuma is bound to confront in the Union. 
Dismantling these insidious institutional cultures do not 
rely solely on her experience but on the support both 
internally and externally to enable that shift. Dlamini-
Zuma’s much touted success at the South African Ministry 
of Home Affairs was based on a coherent government 
mandate to go in and transform it. This is not the same 
set of circumstances that shape her entry into the com-
mission that guides what is primarily a political body.
Secondly, the circumstances that led to Dlamini-
Zuma’s position at the helm of the commission have 
been characterized by multiple concerns. It would be 
short sighted of us to dismiss them and reduce this to  
“a woman going to show the men how it is done”. There 
have been multiple analyses offered on the commission 
leadership impasse, which I do not wish to rehearse here 
except through a summary. Despite popular perception, 
it has been argued in many African diplomatic spaces 
that most African leaders were not pleased with the turn 
of events in Libya, which was unfortunately framed by 
their ‘consent’3 to the now infamous United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1973. There has been squabbling over 
whether the resolution was explicit about regime change 
and whether indeed African leaders in interpreting ‘by 
any means necessary’ refused to see how that enabled 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to happen 
on Libya. Perhaps this was the proverbial straw on the 
camel’s back that in effect split African nations in terms 
of being able to coalesce African interests at a global in-
stead of prioritising national interests because of foreign 
financial flows for budgetary support. It is a fact that 
Africa was divided internationally on Libya and NATO.
But Libya only had an accumulated effect after the 
failure of the AU to offer decisive public and continental 
leadership on the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, which was in the 
end resolved through the heavy intervention of former 
colonial power France. Again the AU would argue that in 
instances where the sub-regional body has shown lead-
ership in the matter like ECOWAS did, their role is to 
reinforce those efforts and not to superimpose its solu-
tions. After all the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) finds contextual interpretation through similar 
frameworks in sub-regional organisations. 
In both cases though, South Africa as one of Africa’s 
strong states played a central role. Some may argue that the 
turn of events in Libya that can be read as a re-assertion 
of imperialism or the treatment of the Mbeki and subse-
quent Jacob Zuma led mediation efforts in Cote d’Ivoire 
slighted one of Africa’s giants. It is here that the question 
of South Africa’s hegemonic interests must be understood 
and the Dlamini-Zuma candidature as representative of 
Southern Africa located. I do not argue that South 
Africa’s interests both economic and political have not 
been pursued in other ways. South Africa’s economic 
imprint through diverse business interests some more 
visible than others such as the almost ubiquitous pres-
ence of Woolworths, Shoprite, Mr. Price, MTN and cable 
television provider DSTV in major capitals across Africa 
is evident. Most of our countries on the other hand do 
not necessarily enjoy the same opportunities in a highly 
protected business environment in South Africa
Whether we believe that unwritten rules cannot be 
broken, the insistence by South Africa that Dlamini-Zuma’s 
candidature was a sub-regional response in a context where 
it wields enormous economic, political and cultural 
weight is a fallacy. A useful analogy here is the unlikely 
insistence by the USA to field a secretary general for the 
United Nations (UN). Admittedly, the USA and other 
economic and political actors heavyweights exercise their 
power through permanent membership of the powerful 
United Nations Security Council but to insist on exercising 
that power more broadly within the UN would further 
destabilise the delicate balance of power and principles, 
which even if only normatively, frame that body. The 
possibility of positioning and pursuing the candidature 
of a seemingly neutral Southern African state through 
an equally suitable candidate could have been explored. 
Dlamini-Zuma’s impeccable credentials are not at 
issue here. The bane of her tenure will be characterized 
by her ability to manage the perception of states that 
view South Africa as over-bearing, a position that is not 
simply limited to a Francophone/Anglophone divide. 
While arguments have been made about Dlamini-Zuma’s 
pan African credentials she has fore grounded her South 
African heritage as an essential part of who she is and it 
is these identities that will shape the lenses with which 
her every decision is interpreted. The likelihood that 
gender will become the scapegoat that is used to ration-
alize Dlamini-Zuma’s unpopular decisions cannot be 
wished away. If I draw an analogy to Barrack Obama’s 
presidency, the arguments about his lack of foreign policy 
experience in addition to decisions that have been con-
structed as both unpopular by the opposition or unaccept-
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able by the Black community because he is the first Black 
president are likely to occur to Dlamini-Zuma as well. 
Do we expect a radical reduction in the spikes of 
sexual and gender based violence during situations of 
armed conflict? Do we anticipate a more nuanced engage-
ment around peace security issues on the continent without 
relating questions of gender equality to women’s issues 
alone but instead construct it as one of the central deter-
minants of how we understand the inequalities of the 
society more broadly? I don’t think these can be central 
factors or expectations against which we in the movement 
assess Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure. Unfortunately a gender 
celebration frames it as such.
Dlamini-Zuma has a tough balancing act, which like 
Obama involves illuminating the complexities of identity 
and belonging and this automatically leaves most disap-
pointed. This involves demonstrating that she is not 
only a South African woman candidate but also a leader 
that brings a holistic perspective to her position. She has 
the unenviable task of seeking to reverse neo-imperialist 
gains, which I suspect informed South Africa’s keen  
interest on this seat in terms of shifting geo-political  
dynamics. This will be done against the stark realities  
of nations whose budgets are highly dependent on the 
West and this inadvertently shapes their foreign policy 
decisions. Most immediately there is a perceived 
Francophone/Anglophone divide that she has the task  
of remedying despite being constructed as central to  
cementing that divide. This is in addition to a host of 
active and latent conflicts raging across the continent.
Support Dlamini- Zuma we must, but the women’s 
movement must be alive to the fact that her gender will 
be the scapegoat for any unpopular decisions she makes. 
We must not place analysis in the public domain that 
makes this ‘excuse’ a foregone conclusion in a context 
where gender is easily mobilized to ‘explain’ away inef-
ficiency and inexperience. As the women’s movement 
we must resist the urge to be drawn into comparative 
analysis based on her predecessor as a man and her as a 
woman. Let us claim this opportunity to reverse essen-
tialised notions about women’s leadership and instead 
up the ante on debates on transformative leadership more 
broadly through an emphasis on dismantling prohibi-
tive bureaucratic cultures within institutions such as the 
African Union and transforming the analytical basis on 
which gender discourses are framed as critical to this 
shift. The women versus men dichotomy, does not move 
us towards a transformation platform. 
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